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Statement of nurnose: 
I prooose to appraise the book Individual Behaviord,y Donald Snygg 
and Arthur U. Combs from the standuoint of its fitness for use as a 
text book for young students. I shall attem~t to show that 1) the 
language used in the book is confusing, and that 2) it tends to 
weaken the conceotion of truth which a student might have, and 
that 3) the text boo'k: makes no provision for man's s;:,i.ritual need 
in its theory of education. 
I. Man has a s~iritual need. 
II. The terminology used in the text is confusing. 
A. The word phenomenology and its related terms is mis-used. 
:9. The word fact is giv13n a different :meaning, which may alter 
the thinking of a student in a way that may be detri-
Mental to him in later life. 
C. The meaning of the word experience is not sufficiently 
clarified for the student. 
D. The term reality has been perverted. 
E. The term differentiation seems to be just a new way of 
expressing an old concept. 
III. The text book weakens a student's recognition of truth. 
IV. The text book overlooks man's spiritual need which can be 
nourished by Poetry, history,and nature. 
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AN APPRAISAL OF A CURRENT TREND IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
AS PRESEN'l'ED IN A RECENT TEXTBOOK 
"Wahrheit und Dichtung" 
( "'Iruth of fact and truth of poet.ry11 ) 
In a speed-driven, space-conscious, rear-ridden world Educators 
today are aware of their responsibility to man as never before and 
are desperately seeking ways to avert this civilization's self'-
destruction. A study of the history or education from earliest 
known records till now shows that teachers have always felt a 
certain responsibility to man, have always sought better ways to 
teach, and have varied their methods hopefully with the changing 
times and demands. But urgency has never been or the essence as 
it is today. 
The educational aim thus tar through the ages has been a common 
one and has been a direct result of man's creative or spiritual 
"instinct." This "instinct" may be thought of in a number of ways 
and may be verbalized in a number of ways. It may be caJ.led man's 
urge to climb or to reach higher or to attain a better status; man's 
longing to lmow Truth--his inborn curiosity which will not be denied 
and which makes him forever ask "Why? 11 ; man's awareness of Good--a 
certainty that there~ something better and his need to find it; 
his awareness of a conflict within him--the material puJ.ling against 
the spiritua.L; and some wiJ.l call this creative instinct simply an 
awareness of the lmowability of things--man's need to acquire 
!mow.Ledge. 
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Many psychologists today incline to the theory that man's onl.y 
urge is his .fundamental and basic need to "maintain and enhance seu. 111 
They describe him as a creature of his environment rather than as 
potential.ly the creator of his environment. Whatever the difference 
today in educational theory., educators do agree on the unique quality 
of the probl.em facing them. Whereas aJ.l teachers of different eras 
in the past have shared a common probl.em of improving the species., 
today's educators face a unique problem--that of keeping the species 
on the face of the earth. The immediacy of such a problem is obvious 
since total annihiJ.ation does not threaten us in one hundred years, 
in fifty years., or in one year; it threatens us now. There is not 
time al.lowabJ.e for costly mistakes. There is only a need--urgent 
and critical--for a sound, strong, and universal phiJ.osophy of edu-
cation. We must decide now where we want to go., educationally., and 
go there in as straight a line as possible. 
It seems to me that the main difficulty inevitably encountered 
in deciding upon an acceptabJ.e phiJ.osophy of education stems from 
the above mentioned question of whether or not man can create or in-
f'J.uence appreciably his own environment., whether or not man has a 
choice in his actions., and whether or not it is desirable that he 
continue to feel as he has in the past that he is capab.le of exer-
cising a will in governing his own behavior. Adopting a purely 
environmentalist view as a sol.e theory wouJ.d tend to keep educators 
1. Individual Behavior., Donald Seygg and Arthur U. Combs., New York, 
Harper and Brothers., 1949, p. 63. 
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concerned with behaviorism., the aim being to observe., permit., infer., 
predict and discuss a!! kinds of behavior clinically and scientifi-
ca!ly. I have labelled this type of educator "behaviorist" because 
he seems more intrigued with the festering sores or the behavior 
itself than he is with feeding the undernourished mind. Unti! the 
spirit and mind are nourished., outward manifestations of an inner 
deficiency wi!l persist and the "behaviorist" wi.ll have 11busy work" 
in plenty. The salve of 11permissiveness11 is their key remedy, whi!e 
food for the mind is neglected. 
The existence of sharply differing viewpoints or theories among 
educators has not till now seemed so crucial; but due to the unique-
ness and immediacy of humanity's present dilemna, a decision nmst 
be made as to what philosophy- is best. Therefore a carefu.L considera-
tion of the way we seem to be heading shou!d be in order. In order 
to show the inherent limitations and potentially demoralizing 
implications of the behaviorist interpretation of experience, I 
have sel.ected a current textbook in the fie!d of educational 
psychology.2 I sha!l criticize this text on the grounds that it 
tends to be confusing to a young student both in language used and 
in ideas expressed; I sha!l secondly try to show that such a be-
haviorist approach tends to neglect two very important "foods" 
which can and shou!d be administered to individuals as a means 
of combatting behavior probl.ems at their source. There are many 
such ways of strengthening a young person's mind as for example 
2. Individua! Behavior, Donald Snygg and Arthur U. Combs!t 
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through acquiring knowledge of and proficiency in mathematics, 
science, or music. But I have picked the two important fields of 
Poetry (literature) and history to illustrate my theory that Snygg 
and Comb~ so-called "phenomenological" approach is not adequate if 
used as a sole theory of education. 
My purpose in placing principal emphasis on the terminology 
used by the authors is to show that often the whole meaning of a 
book may be obscured by Pedaguese ;3 that young people may accept 
such a book blindly, confused by its display of Pedaguese; that 
because of such unthinking acceptance, a who.Le crop of be.Lievers 
may mushroom up like a cult and may use the catch-phrases, half-
truths, and not-understood ideas with bad results. If the weakness 
in one such behaviorist text book can be shown, perhaps an improved 
and supplemented educational philosophy will result. 
I believe Snygg and Combs• text may be confusing to students 
because new meanings have been applied to old terms and those new 
meanings have not been correctly redefined and, in some instances, 
correctly used. 
1. The tenn phenomenology and its related tenns as used in 
Individual Behavior. 
3. "But teaching is still a new vocation; and the teachers .Long for 
the time when their business sha.L.L be recognized as a profession. 
To this end many of them feel that they nm.st magnify their dal.Ling 
and confound the uninitiated with a wondrous technicality of language. 
It is but natural. They must invent such a language, whether or not · 
there are ideas to justify it. They have invented it. It is Pedaguese." 
A Joysome History of Education, Weiland Hendrich, New York, 
A. G.-Seller, 1925, p. 78'. 
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Whenever a new fiel.d of lmowledge is discovered, new terms 
have to be coined: a name or sign must be invented to stand for 
the newly discovered thing or idea. For example the words googool., 
megaton, radar, and loran are new terms for new things recently dis-
covered in new fields. That is the usual and respected procedure for 
forming a scientific vocabulary and it makes possible the transmitting 
of new lmowledge. A correct and common understanding of what those 
words mean is required before lmowledge of new facts can be spread 
or before science can become what its name signifies: a lmowing. 
But when a term already coined and in good usage which represents 
one idea or class of things is borrowed by a teacher and applied to 
a different concept or class of things, the procedure cannot be said 
to be scientific, and further, a confusion in the student's mind tends 
to occur. The word phenomenology with all its related terms is not a 
new word. It derives from the Greek and its histor,y is as oJ.d. Defi-
nitions and explanations of the terms as given in Webster's!:! 
International Dictionarz1' are as follows: 
phenomenology: 1. The branch of a science dealing with the 
description and classification of phenomena. 
phenomenon: 
2. Scientific description of actual phenomena, 
with avoidance of ail interpretation, ex-
planation, and evaluation. 
1. (phil.) An:, object lmown through the senses 
rather than through thought or intuition. 
Cf. Noumenon. 
2. Any observabJ.e fact or event; specifica.i.fy: 
a) in scientific usage, any fact or event 
of' scientific interest susceptible of 
scientific description and explanation; b) 
in a secondar,y use in science, a rare fact 
or event, or one of unique significance. 
4. Note: Unless otherwise stated Webster's New International 
Dictionary is the authority consulted for all dictionary definitions 
in this paper. 
6 
nhenomenal: Of, ?ertaining to, or of the nature of a phenomenon; 
specifically: a) Known through the senses rather 
than through thought or intuition. b) Concerned 
with observed data rlither than wlth hypotheses; as, 
phenomenal science. 
phenomenalism: (nhil.) a) The theory that limits knowledge to 
phenomena only. b) The theorJ that we lmow only 
phenomena and that there is no existence except 
the phenomenal. 
Bearing in mind that phenomenology is a branch of science dealing 
~1th scientific description of actual phenomena with avoidance of all 
interpretation, explanation, and evaluation, and that phenomena are 
observable facts or events known through the senses, it should be 
obvious that Sqvgg and Combs tend to be confusing in their use of 
these terms .,,hen the following exerpts from the text in que~tion are 
read thoughtfully • 
• • • We h~ve described the external approach to human 
behavior as observing behavior from an outsider's point of 
view. There is another way in which we can observe behavior, 
however, which we shall examine in th.Is volume. That is, we 
may observe human behavior not from an outsider's point of 
view but from the point of view of the behaver himself. This 
frame of reference has sometimes been called the nhenomenologi-
cal approach and sometimes the personal anproach to behavior. 
(pp. 8, 9.) 
In the personal frame of reference we attemnt to observe 
beh~vior from the point of view of the individual himself. 
(p. 10) 
In choosing between the ext~rnal and the phenomenological 
points of vigw the only question a psychologist has to 3sk is 
"Which is the more effect,ive frame of reference for the nre-
diction of human cehavior? 11 (-;,. 12) 7'rhe ''external" approach 
has been previously defined by the authors as the approach 
which observes behavior from an outsider's point of view. o. 8::/ 
I wish to point out here that from the very denotation of the 
word observe there is no other vi~oint possible but an external 
one. Observing behavior means to note or watch or see behavior and 
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requires an observer whom I shall call A and the behaver whom I shall 
call B. There is no other way for! to observe except with his own 
eyes or from an "external" viewpoint. A can not see inside B's mind 
or ever know B's private world." ! can only imagine, judge, o:r guess 
at B's world and he is therefore not observing facts or ~vents at all. 
! is instead using his own experience, knowledge, imagination, and 
powers of inference plus what little he can truly observe of B's 
visible behavior to explain and predict B's future behavior. This 
necessitates "interpretation, explanation, and evaluation" of facts 
which ~re completely unobservable and phenomenology as Sn;ygg and Combs 
use it is in direct contradiction to its dictionary definition. There-
fore, confusion may exist in a student's mind when he reads: "In the 
personal frame of reference we" (!_) "attempt to observe behavior from 
the point of view of the individual" (~) "himself," or that "~ may 
observe behavior not from an outsider's point of view but from the 
point of view of the behaver himself. 11 Since, then, B's 11 phenomenan 
or facts and events can never be scientifically observed (either by 
himself or by!_) and can only be imaginatively inferred by!_ and 
unscientifically recalled by~ through introspection, why is either 
of the terms 11 nhenomenology11 or "science" applied to the anproach 
set forth by Snygg and Combs. Use of the term ttpersonal" alone 
would seem to be a more accurate description and therefore less 
confusing. 
Having established in the beginning of their text that the 
phenomena being discussed are those ?ertaining to~ only and hence 
unobservable (a completely new and different definition being re-
quired), SI13rgg and Combs continue to use from time to time the 
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orthodox meaning of the term phenomena which adds to the confusion 
already created: 
The phenomena of physics were accordingly purged of all 
characteristics which are not reducible to length. As a re-
sult, the world of the physical sciences, after Galileo, 
consisted of only those aspects of phenomena which can be 
expressed in units of length •••• If phenomena could not 
be measured in terms of length they could not be dealt with 
by methods of physics •••• All (measurements) ••• are 
observed by the scientist from the same point •••• Since 
any t190 qualified observers viewing a situation from the 
same time must necessarily agree closely in their measure-
ments of length a great area of agreement was discovered 
by the physicists as soon as they began to ignore all other 
aspects of phenomena. (pn. 339-340, passim.) 
It is obvious that in the latter quot.11tions Snygg and Combs are 
using the word phenomena to mean "any observable fact or event ••• 
of scientific interest susceptible of scientific description and 
explanation." (dictionary) One is tempted to ask 'facetiously, 
"When is a nhenomenon not I'! Phenomenon?", the answer being, "When 
the term is used by 1Phenomenologists 1 • •l 
Armed with the rtpersonal a'Oproach1• definition of a phenomenolo-
gist, a student next comes to an explanation in the text of 
phenomenal fields: 
By the phenomenal field we mean the entire universe, 
including himself, as it is experienced by the individual 
at the instant of action. (p. 15) 
All behavior, without excention, is completely de-
termined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field of the 
behaving organism. (p. 15) 
••• the Phenomenal field is ••• simply the uni-
verse of naive experience in which each individual lives 
•••• No matter what wa are told, our own phenomenal 
field will always seem real, substantial, and solid to 
us. It is the only field and oniy reality we can directly 
experience. It includes all the universe of which we are 
aware--including not only the physical entities which 
exist for us but such other entities as justice, injustice, 
and ~ublic opinion. (pp. 15, 16) 
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But since the phenomenal field of~ can never be observed and 
since A who is observing~ behavior cannot observe B's phenomena 
and can only interpret !!, from his own (A •s) seemingly "'real, sub-
stantial, and solid" field, (see above quotation, p. 16) and since 
A must use his own thought to imagine B's field, there is no true 
scientific phenomena involved and the process used to ~redict behavior 
should not be called phenomenology at all if the dictionary definitions 
are valid. Since .Snygg and Combs depend so much on reasoning and 
imagination in their theory of the understanding and prediction of 
behavior, it seems to me -they might cause confusion in the mind of 
a student who reads in the dictionary that phenomenology is concerned 
with scientifically observable facts or events with 1tavoidance of all 
interpretation, explanation, and evaluation." 
2. The term fact as used in Individual Behavior. 
Since phenomena are "observable facts or events," we must under-
stand what is meant by fact if we expect to use the word phenomenology. 
Dictionary definitions of the word fact ~re as follows: 
1. A thing done; deed; (obsolete) 
2. Tr~t which has actual existence; an event. 
J. The quality of being actual; actuality; -as, the 
realm of fact is distinct from that of fancy. 
4. The statement of a thing done or existing; as, 
his facts are false; loosely, the things sup-
posed (even though falsely) to be done or to 
exist. 
Bertrand Russell's definition of fact: 
I mean by a 'fact• something which is there whether 
anybody thinks so or not ••• Facts are what make statements 
true or false ••• Most facts are indenendent of our volitions; 
that is why they are called 'hard', 'stubborn' or 'ineluctable.' 
Physical facts ••• are independent, not only of our volitions 
but even of our existence.5 
5. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, New York, Harner and Brothers, 
19h9, PP• 1420158, pas~ 
i' 
"")I 
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Snygg and Com~'s_definition of~: 
Science is constantly seeking for facts; but in the lRst 
few years we have come to understiind facts in a new way. A 
fact, we find, is not an independent thing that we can memo-
rize and depend U?On and know that it will always be true. 
It is true only in its frame of reference, which means that 
it is false in others. What one thinks of as fact depends 
u,on the frame of reference from which he makes his observa-
tions. (In~ividual Behavior, p. 4) 
Having thus redefined~ for the student as something not to 
be depended upon and as something which is "true only in its frame 
of reference" etc., Snygg and Combs proceed to use the term fact 
in varying ways throughout the book. The question must naturally 
arise in a student's mind: When are the authors using the accepted 
definition of fact as being something which has "actuality" 
(dictionary) and something which exists nwhether anybody thinks so 
or not," (Russell), and when are they using their own definition 
of fact as being a thing which is "true only in its frame of 
reference, which ~ that it is false_..!.!! .others"? Are not 
Snygg and Combs defining and thinking of illusion, not fact?6 
The following quotations are passages taken from the text 
in which the use of the word fact might confuse a student who had 
been oreviously grounded in the belief that facts "are what make 
statements true or false" regardless of whether anybody thought 
so or not, and regardless cf anyone's "phenomenal field. 11 
6. Webster's Ne'\'r Collegiate Dictionary definition of illusion: 
a perceotion which fails to give the true character of an object 
oerceived. 
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Science is constantly seeking for facts. (p. 4) 
It seems clear that a science must do more than collect facts. 
(p. 5) 
Facts previously unobserved acquire meaning and recognition, and 
they in turn make possible the discovery of new facts and relations. 
(p. 5) 
The progress of sc:i.ence •••• is in two directions. The first 
is toward the discovery of new facts. This unceasing search is con-
tinually turning up new facts inexplicable in the old frames of 
reference. In turn, the scientist is forced to develop new frames 
of reference wide enou£h to encompass the greatest number of known 
facts at any moment./ Known facts? But according to their definition 
above, ~ge 4, facts cannot be depended upon or knOffll as true.7 Once 
a more adequate frame of reference has been achieved, its effectiveness 
is soon demonstrated by the discovery of a great number of new facts 
and relations. (p. 5) 
let us examine this prindple by examining Fig. 1. As man 
reached a ooint in his development where it became necessary for him 
to deal with numbers of things, repre-
sented in our figure by the marks from 
A to B, he develoned a number system, 
renrese.ated by the triangle ABC. The 
development of this number system makes 
it nossible for him to deal with his 
environment more effectively than be-
fore and to understand many new concepts. 
In time, however, this number system 
became inadequate as new facts were 
discovered and new needs arose, repre-
sented in our figure by thl3 marks from 
B to D. ThP-se new facts - /ictual?7 
could not be dealt with in the old-
number system and out of this need 
a new frame of reference, ADE, was 
developed, called algebra. The new 
frane of reference did not~ what 
had gone before 7cf7above the state-
ment that a fact-is "true in its frame of reference, which means it is 
false in other's: pAee 4.7 But even this frame of reference could not 
last forever and soon !IIB.n 1s ins~tiable striving made it. necessary to 
deal with still ::nore new facts and problems, D to F. This in turn led 
to the development of still another frame cf reference, AFG, which 
mathematicians know as calculus. This relationship of facts and frames 
of reference is characteristic of the Progress of science. Through the 
continuous search for facts and frames of reference in which they can 
be comprehended the frontiers of knowledge are ~ushed forward. (pp. 5-6) 
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Some study of the above paragranhs together with the illustration, 
Fig. 1., will m!lke it apparent that Snygg and Combs were using the 
accepted concept of fact in develoning their own idea of fact as that 
which is "true only in its own frame of reference, which means that it 
is false in others •11 Figura 1. does illustrate the way in which man's 
knowledge enlarges through discovery of additional facts, (orthodox 
definition), b11t it does not illustrate the point which the authors 
claim to illustrate which is: a fact is not an "independent thing 
we ••• can depend upon as true and know that it will always be 
true. It is true only in its frame of reference, which means that 
it is false in others." Fig. 1. shows quite clearly that AB (numbers 
of things) is still depended upon and known to be fact, that ABC, num-
ber system, and ADC, algebra, are not only true in their "new frame of 
reference" (Snygg and Combs) but they remain true and are to be de-
pended uoon as true in the total and enlarged ''frame of reference" 
which Snygg and Combs denote by AFG. The illustration shows that 
facts which are true remain true even when a frame of reference is 
extended or enlarged by the addition of new facts. But Snygg and 
Combs say they are showing by Fig. 1. that "facts are true only 
in their frame of reference which means that they are false in others.it 
(p. h) 
I believe that to take a term so firmly fixed in the student's 
mind as the word fact and attempt to give it a different meaning and 
at the same time to continue ~o use it inconsistently throughout the 
text may be confusing. It might be better to coin a new term which 
would denote something which seems to be true but which instead is 
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as variable as the people existing on this earth today--a term which 
would denote a thing completely lacking in the quality of actuality, 
trueness, or "isness." A young student who is encouraged to believe 
that actual truth does not exist, that a fact is alwa:rs only what it 
seems to him to be, has been deprived of one valuable yardstfok for 
straight thinking. He has been given an excuse--a crutch--which he 
may use all his life to justify his own inab:Uity to determine what 
is true or what is not true and what is just or not just. If he has 
not been encouraged to believe that truth does exist and always has 
existed and always will exist, waiting to be discovered by man, this 
young student may never realize his potential as a human being. I 
believe with Emerson: 
We know truth when we see it, let sceptic and scoffer 
say what they choose. Foolish people ask you, when you 
have sooken what they do not wish to hear, 'How do you know 
it is truth, and not an error of your own?' We know truth 
when we see it, from opinion, as we know when we are awake 
that we are awake. It was a grand sentence of Emanuel 
Swedenborg, which would alone indicate the greatness of 
that man's perception--'It is no proof of a man's under-
standing to be able to affirm whatever he Pleases; but to 
be able to discern that what is true is true, and that what 
is false is false--this is the mark and character of in-
telligence.' 7 
It seems to me that there are many passages in the text, 
Individual Behavior which would tend to weaken a young nerson's 
belief in truth or which tend to build a feeling in him that there 
is nothing one can ever depend on as true. It can be noted in the 
ex~rpts which follow that Snygg and Combs are building U? a concept 
7. Brooks Atkinson, ed., The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, New 
York, Random House, 1940, p. 268. ~ 
that there are only two sureties in this world, 1) what the ~ehaver B 
thinks is true ("phenomenological") and 2) what a majority ·of eA'ternal 
observers say is true or nfact." Facts or phenomena which are true 
whether anybody thinks so or not and which may exist and be true out-
side of both A's and~ phenomenal field, do not seeM to be provided 
for at all in Snygg and Combs' theory. 
In other words, our study will be directed toward estab-
lishing (1) the objective facts, that is, the facts as they are 
agreed upon by external observers, and (2) the meaning of those 
facts for the subject. We might call these the objective facts 
and the phenomenological facts." {-o. 249) 
If it can be born in mind that, according to Snygg and Combs, 
these "external observers" are themselves only able to see fact accord-
ing as it seems to~, that--in other words--these so-called 
determiners of 11 objective fact" are themselves unable to determine 
fact objectively since they in turn are imprisoned by their own 
"phenomenological fields" and can only see fact phenomenologically, 8 
then it must be apnarent that Snygg and Combs do not admit the 
existence of a truth which does not depend upon either A or B. By 
11 external observers" the authors seem to mean a number of flesh and 
blood people since the very term observer demands animateness. In 
attempting to clarify the point the writers say: "From a phenomeno-
logical point of view •objective• facts are derived from the 
phenomenal fields of several observers. The objective facts in a 
B. "No matter what we are told, our own phenomenal field will always 
seem real, substantial, and solid to us. It is the only field and 
the only reality we can directly experience.n ~nygg and Combs, n. 16. {I, the 'objective observer', can, then, never be objective. He, too, 
must always see things only phenomenoloiically, and his view may be 
as distorted as that of ~, the behaver.!./ 
particular culture or subculture thus represent the least common 
denominator of the phenomenal fields of a number of observers.n9 
From that one can only draw the conclusion that there are only two 
ki!lds of "facts" which are conceivable: 1) the "fact" which :a (the 
behaver, or one's own self) thinks is true, and the "fact" which 
seems to be true to a majority of people, thought of as society. 
?Jowhere in the text was I able to find grounds for believing 
that a fact which is true can exist which is irrespective of either 
A's "fact" or B's "fact"; that fact may exist and be true unnerceived 
by either A or B--a fact which is ~ and which I shall speak of as 
T. Man has always been able to conceive of T and man's urge has 
cgused him to grope tcn,rrard it in different ages in spite of the 
opinion of a majority of observers. Creators of gr~at literature 
as they portray character will often make use of a method which 
will illustrate what I mean by T, or~ fact that,!!, regardless of 
whether anybody thinks so or not. A writer may first give us A 1s 
observations and opinions of a certain character in the novel or 
play or poem and this "certain character" I shall call B {behaver): 
in other 'f'rords, we first see B through A's ayes or viewpoint and 
thus learn one set of "facts" about B. Next the author will show 
us B's viewpoint and we will sea B's picture of himself and his set 
of "facts." Finally we find T when the writer gives us facts as 
they actually exist, and this he is able to do from the third or 
God-like point of vi9w which only a writer of fiction and drama 
9. Ibid., o. 249, i'ootnote 3. 
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can imitate. It is in this way that literature can sometimes give 
us a stronger feeling for truth than W':3 are able to receive from 
our daily contacts with society. "Literature is a point outside 
of our hodiernal circle through which a new one may be described. 
The use of literature is to afford us a platform whence we may com-
mand a view of our Present life, a nurchase by which we may move it. 1110 
J. The term exoerience as used in Individual Behavior. 
The word exoerience can rave a broad meaning or a more narrow 
one, but Snygg and Combs do not clarify their use of it by definition 
and some confusion may result in a student's mind because of that 
lack of clarification. On nage twenty of the text is this sentence: 
"Experiences are phenomenal in character and the fact that two indi-
duals are in the same physical situation does not even give a 
relatively common ex:perience if they already differ markedly in 
their phP.nomenal fields.n 
The diet ionar~r defines the word experience as fo llo,vs: 
1. The actual living through an event or events; 
actual enjoyment or suffering; hence, the effect 
upon the judgment or feelings nroduced by personal 
and direct impressions; as, to know b,r experience. 
4. (a) The sum total of the conscious events which 
compose an individual life. (b) Observed facts and 
events in contrast with what is supplied by thought; 
as, knowledge originates in exnerience. 
It should be noted that there is some difference in the dictionary 
definitions as given in 1. and in (a) and (b) of 4. Do Snygg and Combs 
mean by expArience to include all "conscious events" only, these being 
observable facts or events, or do they mean to exclude the possibility 
10. "Circles," The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 285. 
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of a mental event such as might be described as an action of thought? 
Or do they mean by experience the quite different definition which 
includes as experience the "effect upon the judgment or feelings pro-
duced by personal and direct impressions?" With the latter definition 
one could ca 11 eXPerience all the things which 11 happentt to a child 
who spends any time with nature~all the ~observable feelings, 
impressions, and judgments which a child alone with woods, fields, 
streams, and sky can have. Men like Tennyson, Wordsworth, William 
Morris, Ruskin, Shakespeare, Whitman, and Emerson knew that kind of 
experience. The kind of exoerience defined in the dictionary under 
1. implies impressions gained from the mental "experiencett of 
reading literature or history. Do Snygg and Combs mean this when 
they say "experience"? Or do the:, mean only "observed facts and 
events in contrast with what is suoplied by thought"? They do not 
define their term other than to say that 1•expariences are phenomenal 
in character." A student, then, must draw his concl~sions as to the 
exact meaning of the word from context alone. 
We come to accept as our own reality the definitions 
of our experience and of those who most closely affect 
us ••• Out of the interaction of the child with the 
world about him, tha individual comes to differentiate 
more and more clearly his -phenomenal self. Obviously, 
this concept can only be a function of the way he is 
treated by thos~ who surround him. As he is loved or re..:. 
jected, praised or punished, fails or is able to compete, 
he comes gradually to regard himself as important or 
unimportant, adequate or inadequate, handsome or ugly, 
honest or dishonest, and even to describe himself in 
terms of those who surround him. The child can only 
see hiMself in terms of his experience, and in terJII~ 
of the treatment he receives from those responsible 
for his development. He is likely ., •• to be strongly 
affected by the labels which are applied to him by 
other people •••• He can only act in terms of what 
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he regards as the truth about himself. Since his phenomenal 
self is the result of his experience, his behavior can only 
be an outgrowth of the meaning of that exoeri1=mce and he 
must necessarily become in truth what he has been labelled 
by the community which surrounded him. (P".'• 82, 33) 
If the above statements are true, then it must also be true 
that our experience--defined for~ !?z others--is the most important 
factor determining our "reality." Experience, therefore, must mean 
the "sum total of the conscious external and observable facts and 
events of our lives" since the "interaction of those about him" 
(society or community) is his only effective means of interpreting 
his eXPeriences. A child who 11must become in truth what he has 
been labelled by the community" has had no other kind of experience 
than that which comes from the "interaction of the child with the 
world about him. 11 A student might naturally conclude, then, that 
by the term exuerience Snygg and Combs would exclude as ineffective 
or unreal the influence of a child's thought as he reads, studies, 
or contemplates nature alone. A student might quite excusably con~ 
elude from what he has just read that society makes~ child~ 
determines~ reality of his experiences. 
A thoughtful student, however, might re-examine some of those 
assP-rtions. He might, for exanrple, discover an inconsistency in this 
statement: "The child who nossesses a concept of himself as 'good' 
but is called 'thief' by his parents or others surrounding him, 
etc. 11 and he might ask how a child with such ttparents and others 
surrounding him" could have ever possessed a good concept of himself 
in the first -place. Where did he get his concept of himself as ngood" 
if this "concept can only be a function of the way he is treated by 
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those who surround him"? A child who is able to think of himself 
as 11 good11 when his parents or others have never shared that view 
of him must have gotten that feeling of himself as good from another 
kind of exoerience--a kind the importance of which Snygg and Combs 
do not admit. A student might believe that a child's exnerience 
could be given a good meaning and definition from his mental con-
tact with an imaginary community through literature, from individuals 
and events of history, or from the "interaction" of his consciousness 
with nature--completely freed from a cor.llllunity of flesh and blood 
people who call him "bad" or "thief •11 But it is to be feared that 
most young students will not be so thoughtful and ·will instead 
ac~ept as true their text book 1 s assertion that a child's "concept 
of himself ?an onJ..y ?ea function of the way he is treated by those 
who surround him" and that he "must necessarily become in truth 
what he has been labelled by the conmunity ,vhich surrounds him. 11 
Such assertions give no importance to the role of .either literature 
or history in the development of a self which is less dependent unon 
outside threat and nublic opinion, a self thereby more capable of 
orig:i.nal and evolutionary thought. Such assertions also tend to 
leave the author's meaning of the ;vord exoerience unclarified in a 
student 1s mind. 
4. The te~ realit;y a.s used in Individual Behavior. 
I have tried to show that many terms such as phenomenological, 
fact, and P.Xperience have unique meanings for Snygg and Combs which 
must be accept9d by their students. It is nw opinion that these 
terms as they are used in Individual Behavior have lost their 
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integrity, since th~J now represent quite different concepts from 
the ones for which they have always stood. The word reality is a 
prime example of such perversion in concept. Upon acceptance of 
its new usage depends one's acceptance of the whole "phenomenologi-
cal" approach or theory. Let us see what that usage is and all that 
its new meaning implies. 
Dictionary definition: 
1. State, character, quality, or fact of being real, 
existent, self-existent or genuine, or of having real 
being or existence; as, to doubt the reality of pygmies, 
or matter, or of God. 
2. Someone real or something real or realized; an 
actual person, event, situation, or the like; an 
accomplished fact; also, the substance as opposed 
to the anpearance of form of a thing; ••• 
5. (Philosoohy) (a) That which actual]¥ exists; 
that ,vhich is not imagination, fiction, or pretense; 
that which has objective existence, and is not merely 
an idea. 
But according to Sl\Ygg and Combs' interpretation, reality 
is only what seems to be real or what seems to exist to each indi-
vidual and is as variable as the pooulation of the earth. They do 
not admit the quality of truth or "isness" into their definition 
of reality aqymore than they did into their definition of fact and 
exDerj.ence and -ohenomena. It is significant to note, however, that 
Snygg and Combs~in their redefinition of reality--use the word 
more than once with its true meaning. In the following quotations 
I shall enclose the word reality in single quotes when I think the 
authors are using it to convey what seems to be real; whenever it 
seems to me that they are reverting to the dictionary meaning, I 
shall underline the word. Using the same term to convey first one 
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meaning and then another would tend, I think, to confuse any student, 
young or old. 
It /the phenomenal field7 is simply the universe of 
naive exoerience in which each individual lives, the every-
day situation of self and surroundings which each person 
takes to be reality. To each of us the phenomenal field 
of another person contains much error and illusion and seems 
an :i.nteroretation of reality rather than •reality' itself; 
but to the individual himself his phenomenal field is 
'reality,' the only 'reality' he can know. It is much 
richer, more complete, and meaningful than the objective 
f:teld of the "Physical sciences, wh:tch is, in reality, 
merely the shadowy and abstracted lowest conunon denomi-
nator of many phenomenal fields. 
It cannot be too strongly stressed that the restriction 
of 'reality' to the attenuated field of physics means a 
complete abandonment of everything that we ordinarily recog-
nize as real. (p. 15) 
He may therefore agree that the behavior of others is 
due to chance, repetition, habit, disease, or some other 
intrusive cause from outside the 'real situation.' /foot-
note in the text clarifies 'real situation• as: " .-•• 
his own field at the moment; Each person regards his 
present field as 'reality.";] (p. 35) 
(Footnote to page lOJ:) This se,aration of the 
phenomenal self and external realtty is in fact what 
society describes as maladjustment • 
• • • to make our discussion snecific and to relate 
it to the current points of. view and problems of education, 
we shall have to discuss se~arately two different aspects 
of the phenomenal field. /Bear in mind that as statP.d 
above, the phenomenal field is "simply the universe of 
naive exoerience in which each individual lives, the 
everyday situation of self and surroundings which each 
!)arson takes to be reality."7 These aspects are (1) the 
non-self part of the field,-which the individual thinks 
of as his environment; and (2) the phenomenal self. 
It is to the non-self aspects of the field, his 
nhenomenal environment, that the individual looks for 
the means of satisfying his need. Whether his immediate 
goal is food, air, money, friends, or any other of the 
countless goals he may seek in his effort to maintain and 
enhance his Phenomenal self, he looks for it, for the 
most nart, in his environment • He is always seeking some 
goal, because his need to maintain and build up his 
~henomenal self is insatiable. So he is constantly and 
persistently exnloring this non-self nart of his field, 
which he assumes to be external reality. (p. 207) 
By the nhe~omenal self we mean those aspects of the 
phenomen~l field to which we refer when we say 'L. 1 In 
common with the rest of the phenomenal field it has thf3 
feeling of complete reality •••• It will be recalled 
that we h~ve defined the phenomenal.field as the universe, 
including himself, as it anpears to the individual at 
the moment. (pp. Sb,~, passim.) 
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(Note: In other words, to the phenomenal self in his nhenomenal 
field which is the field of 'naive experience', everything in the 
universe must be qualified by the words "as it appears" or 11 as it 
seems to be" and the word "is" must be stricken from our language 
as dead-wood.) 
In this next and final quotation showing the usage of the 
term reality, I shall omit both single quotes and italics and 
let it stand upon its own merit or fault. 
In the developing conceptual worlds of the various 
sciences, each dealing with entities no one has ev13r 
seen, each one finding explanation behind explanation, 
reality behind reality, it is increasingly difficult to 
reg~rd consciousness and awareness as an e~i~henomenon, 
as a curfous by-product of human behavior which is with-
o~t significance or function. 
(Note: I have always thought that schol9rs and nhilosonhars and 
noets have known almost from the beginning of recorded thought that 
men's actions are caused by the action of their minds. As I shall 
point out later, awareness and consciousness are aspects of~.) 
As our nineteenth century concepts of physical realit3r 
as consisting only of solid little chunks of matter fade 
before the wider frem~ of ~odern nhysics, such nn idea 
becomes harder to accept. What we have called reality 
turns out to be only eX!.)erience. /r.f this last sentence 
is to be believed, then there is no such thing as a fact, 
or event, or a stick or a stone, a tree or a star which 
could exist unless there is a phenomenal field with its 
phenomenal self living sor:i.ewhere to "experience" it .7 
As the things we have taken for reality come to be -
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recognized as only schema and concepts of reality which are 
acce~table for the present purposes of a oarticular science 
they lose their priority as causes and we may again be 
willing to acceot as a cause of behavior what conunon sense 
has recognized all along, the schema and concents of the 
individual himself. It would be indeed strange ~nd quite 
contrary to our present conceots of biology if anything 
as widespread as consciousness should have develoned and 
spread unless it ,erformed an essential function in tha 
survival of those orgsnisms which have it. It is our 
assumption that this is correct and that the phenomenal 
field is an essential factor in the efforts of the organism 
to maintain its organization. In our ex11erience, in the 
frame of reference we have chosen, the phenomenal field 
is the behavioral field of the organism, the effective 
cause of its behavior. (p. 352) 
As a commentary upon the last quoted passages, and indeed many 
other oarts of Individual Behavior I offer these words from Emerson: 
A man's po,r19r to connect his thought with its !)roper 
symbol and so to utter it, depends on the simplicity of 
his character, that is, unon his love of truth an<l his 
desire to communicate it without loss. The corruption 
of man is followed by the corruotion of language. When 
simnlicjty of character and the sovereignty of ideas is 
~roken up by the prevalence of secondary desires~the 
desire of riJhes, of pleasure, of power, and of praise--
and duplicity· and falsehood take place of simplicity and 
truth, thep::ser over nature as an interpreter of the will 
is in a degree lost; new imagery ceases to be created, 
and old words are perverted to stand for things which are 
not; a oaoer currency is anoloyed, when t,here is no bullion 
in the vaults. In due time the fraud is manifest, and 
words lose all power to stimulate the understanding or 
th9 affections. Hundreds of writers may be found in 
every long-civilized nation who for a short time believe 
and make others believe that they see and utter truths, 
who do not of themselves clothe one thought in its 
natural garment, but who feed unconsciously on the 
language created by the primary writers of t~i country, 
those, naJ!lely, who hold. Drimarily on nature. 
5. The terms uerception, awareness, differentiation,~-
sciousness, and mind as they are used in Individual 
Behavior. 
11. "Nature," ~ Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 17. 
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Snygg and Combs use the terms awareness, perception, and 
differentiation synonymously, defining each one in turn by use of 
the other two. 
Each of us is constantly searching his field (the universe to 
him) for details and meanings which will batter enable him to satisfy 
his need. This nrocess involves a continuous change in the field, by 
the constant rise of new characters into ground. This process, from 
the noint of view of the behaver, js one of increased awareness of 
details and is th~refore called dil'?erentiation. (pp. 28, 29) 
Whether or not satisfaction of this need /maintenance or en-
hancement of his phenomenal self7 is possible for the individual 
will denend unon the differentiations he is able to make in his 
Dhenome~al field •••• Those whose perceptions make nossible 
th~ satisfaction of need are happy, effective, and efficient 
people. On the other hand, those whose differentiations do not 
permit of need satisfaction are likely to be ineffective. (pp. 115-116) 
Whether or not it is possible for the individual to achieve ne~d 
satisfaction will depend upon the level and unique character of the 
differentiations he is able to make in his phenomenal field. If 
these perceptions result in adequate behavior, all is well •• ~. (p. 117) 
The individual is i:ilways aware of what exists in his phenomenal 
field. In fact, the field might even be described as one's personal 
field of awareness. (p. 116) ;-But there are levels of awareness.7 
Differentiations may exist from extreme vagUeness to very clear-=cut 
well-defined perceptions •••• (?• 116) Differentiations may thus 
occur at any level of awareness ••• (116) 
On the other hand, if these oarents can be assisted to perceive 
JiI!lii\V 's behavior /more adequatel~7 • • • their future perceptions 
w~y be vit~lly af1ected •••• If the DP.rents can be helned to 
regard Jimmy's behavior as that of a child who is upset, a whole 
new series of differentiations ••• becomes possible. Such 
changed oerceptions may n~ke more adequate behavior possible. (p. 118) 
An even more threatening situation exists when the individual 
has two or more differentiations, all of which ara highly threatening. 
For the sake of simolicity, let us sunpose that only two such~-
,::~ptions occur. 
Differentiation may be defined as knowing a difference, the 
basic-act of knowledge. (p. 29) 
One example of change in the field occurs in the process of 
nerception, that is in the process of becoming aware of an object. 
(-p. 36) 
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The above examples from the text should be sufficient to show 
that SrrJgg and Combs do use the terms differentiation, awareness, 
and oerceotion synonymously. The dictionary definitions of these 
three terms also bear out the fact they are very closely related 
terms, but that the process of differentiation must of necessity 
follow and be dependent upon the processP.s of nerception and 
awareness. In other words, to differentiate at all one must first 
become aware of or conscious of or must ryarceive. 
Dictionary definitions: 
perception: 1. Awareness of objects; conscio~sness. 
2. Direct acquaintance of anything through 
the senses. 
3. An immediate or intuitive cognition or 
judgment, often implying nice observa-
tion or subtle discrimination. 
awareness: (see aware) 
aware: Apprised; informed; congnizant; conscious; 
• • • Aware usually implies vigilance in 
observing or in drawing inferences from 
vrhat one sees, etc •••• Conscious 
usually implies awareness of something 
when one allows it to enter his mind and 
usually fixes his attention u~on it. 
differentiate: l. To distinguish by a specific 
difference. 
2. To ascertain or express the 
specific difference of; discrimi-
nat~. 
One may define differentiation as the dictionary does, or one 
may say with Seygg and Combs that "differentintion may be defined 
as knowing a difference" but no matter which ,vay it is exnressed 
both definitions imply that awareness of perception or conscious-
ness must precede if only for a split second the process of 
differentiatj_on; that before a difference can be known between 
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two ob,jects or between two of anything, awareness must first take 
place. 
As the ability to differentiate (know a difference or basic 
act of knowledge) increases, learning, remembering, and reasoning 
increases proportionately. Differentiation, therefore, determines 
learning, rememb'3ring, and reasoning and must precede in t:tme the 
processes of learning, remembering, and rersoning just as awareness 
must nrecede differentiation in time. This is, as I see it, a 
log:tcal Presentation of our nmental" processes and how we acquire 
knowledge. But in Individual Behavior there are sentences which 
seem t.o me to confuse a student's concept of these terms. The 
,ur-oose of these passages was an obvious attempt to clarify, but 
it is nossible that greater obscurity of meaning may result. 
Learning may, therefore, like nerception, be con-
sidered a process of increasing differentiation of the 
field •••• It /Iearning7 is the pattern followed by 
very raoid changes in the-field (perception) and by 
such less rapid ones as problem solving and rote learning 
by Rdults ••• In learning, as in perception the degree 
and direction of differentiation are determined by the 
need of the behaver and the opportunities for differen-
tiation that are available. (p~. 38-39, passim.) 
Just as perception and learning differ only in the 
com:,lexity of the differentiation required, so 11-problem-
solving or "rc:Jsoning" differ from learning only in that 
in "reasoning," the differentiation of procedures is in 
auditory or visual terms, but not in kinesthetic terms 
as it may be in "learning.1i ••• A~ in learning and 
perception • • • • "RemAmbering," like "perceiving, 11 
"learning," and "reasoning," is a process of differen-
tiation •••• The ability of the Phenomenal anoroach -
to reduce such apnarentl,y diverse processes as 'ner-
cen~ion,' 'learning,' 'reasoning,' and 'remembering' 
to a single process conforming to common principles 
is a welcome indication that this fr~-;ne of reference 
may give us the simole orderly causal field for which 
we hope: but is this one nrocess of differentiation 
really adequate? (n. 3'=12, ?assiiii:') 
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Snygg and Combs su.nurarize tl':eir "clarification" of the above 
terms by stAting that differentiation is a single process by which 
one's phenomenal field is changed according to his needs (maintaining 
and enhancing s~lf.) But from my study of the above quotations it 
seems to me that differentiation is just a new way of saying mind. 
The dictiona~J defines ~ as "the sum total of the indi vidua 1' s 
adaptiYe activity, considered as an organized whole; remembrance; 
state of being remembered; direction taken by thinking; that from 
which thought originates; the subject of consciousness; that which 
feels, nerceives wills, thinks; the percerytive and thinking part 
of consciousness; the sum total of the conscious states of an in-
dividual; the conscious element or factor in the universe; the 
qu~lity, relatedness, or tem~oral organization exhibited by a 
spatial extensity, and related to it in a manner analogous to 
the relation of consciousness to a conscious organism. 1t One 
wonders how the term differentiation conveys any more meaning 
than the word mind conveys. 
In defense of the "nhenomenoloej_cal auproach11 as a means 
of prec!icting individual behavior the authors say: 11 It avoids 
and mak9s meaningless many persistent insoluble problems faced 
by the external aryproach, which is unable to explain individual 
behavior on the basis of its own physical frame of reference and 
must necessarily ascribe individual and deviate characteristics 
to other areas such as mind, ryast experience, habit, or the ner-
vous system, which are not ooen to verification." (p. 29) Yet 
Snygg and Coobs have already themselves stated that 0?119's 
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behavior de~ends u~on differentiation and have described differentiation 
in .1u.st the same way that we think of mind, namely: consciousness, 
awareness, perception, reasoning, learning, etc. They admit more 
than once in their text that an individual's field is not open to 
observation. But th97 criticize the use of the mind-conceot as an 
explanation for varying behavior in these words: 
Behavior /under the old mind-concept7 was due to sensa-
tion or reflection, instinct or reason, was voluntary or non-
voluntary-, ,.,.as innate or learned, was emotional or rational, 
was noril'.al or abnormnl. What was seen was a nercention; or 
it was an illusion and therefore unreal. Prediction was 
impossible because of the number of independent nrocesses 
involved. After almost three centuries of study the mind 
remains an explRmitOI'lJ concept only, ~ompletel:y usele~ 
for the study of individual behavior. (p. 343) 
Since by their own definition and subsequent "clarification" 
the ~rocesses of differentiation seem to be the same processes 
which we have for a long time attributed to ~ind, the question 
may arise in a student's thoughts: are these ideas new, or are 
they old·ideas in new dress? For Snygg and Combs have asserted 
that one's behavior is determined by change in the field (differ-
entiations--mind) and thgt these changes in the field (unobservable 
to the outsider) are a matter of the one process of differentiation 
(pe.rception, awareness, consciousness, learning, reasoning, knowing--
mind?). Could it not be asserted just as trul;r that an individual's 
behavior is determined by his mind?--When "phenomenologists" say 
that control or change in an individual's behavj.or is achieved by 
control or change in his "fia.ld," and that this control or change 
of "field" is a process of "differentiation," are they not saying 
what has been recognized for a long time by creative thinkers of 
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all ages: namely, that an individual's ~--his knowledge, awareness, 
or ~erceotive powers--determines his actions? or that an individual 
is the oroduct of his thought? 
The fact that one uses the·term mind to express the cause of 
behavior does not necessarily mean that one must think of mind as 
existing indenendently of the "organism.•• Seygg and Combs refer 
to the mind-body explanation, or to the mind-body dichotomy, as 
"inadequate" and so proceed to throw out t.he term "mind.it They 
use the term phenomenal field (formerly called one's background 
or eJq>erience) and the :.erm differentiation (formerly thought of 
as mental processes) and claim to have moved into a "new frame of 
reference." When one studies carefully their definitions and 
clarification of the terms they use, when one realizes that the 
words perception, awareness, and consc:J.ousness all represent man's 
idea or concept of mind, one wonders what is new about this 
"phenomenological" anproach or what is 11wider11 about this "frame 
of reference": "Once however, we are willing to move into a wider 
frame of .reference and accept the common-sense concept that aware-
ness is a cause of behavior it becomes aoparent that the phenomenal 
field plays a vital role in the survival of the organlsm. 11 (l'.>. 3L9) 
·Im my nrl.nd there has never been disagreement with the authors' 
postulate that all behavior is caused. My l'.>oint of departure has 
been at the confusing forest of tenns a student; must thrash through 
before he can arrive at last into the clearing with the simple but 
. 12 
"common-sense" concept that awareness is a cause of hehavior. 
12. See above, pp. 22, 2). 
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However, aside from the criticism that the terminology in 
Individual Behavior is difficult to master and may tend to be con-
fusing, further appraisal should be made. In the hands of a trained 
psychiatrist who is concerned with therapy for correcting or curing 
already established behavior jn problem-children or in problem-adults, 
such a text as Individual Behavior should be of great value; but to a 
young student? I am inclined to wonder and for four reasons: 
1. Every exanrole of behavior cited in the text is an examnle 
of unsatisfactory behavior; most of the behavior problems described 
are those concerned with bodily frustration of some kind; permissive-
ness of an,y or all visceral experiences is the ~ey to therapy no 
matter how law-level the "visceral exoeriencesn tend to be. One 
may come out of such a study feeiing the same distaste one experiences 
after watching monkeys in a cage as they are sickening~y absorbed in 
the contemplation and canture of their own fleas. The concept of 
the body (physical organism) and its struggle to maintain or enhance 
itself as being the main motivating force of all behavior is not an 
uplifting one nor is it one like~y to "nourish the spirit." 
Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the 
self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences 
of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic 
level1!nto a ~onsistent relationship with the concept of 
s~lf. 
Ps;s:rchological maladjustment exists i'l"hen the organism denies 
to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, 
which are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of 
the self-structure. When this situation exi§ts, there is 
a basic or potential psychological tension.11 
16. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, Cambridge, Mass., 
The Riverside Press, 1951, n. 510. 
17. Ibid., n. 513. 
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Those two quotations are from the -,,,ritings of an eminent nsycho-
therapist and exoress the view-noint found in therapist texts such 
as Axline's ~lay Therapy as well as Snygg and Combs' Individual 
Behavior. 
2. I feel there is too much emphasis placed upon the importance 
of adjusting to the grouo and not enough stress laid on the importance 
of being an individual •. The interpretations, definitions, and pres-
sure of "the neople -vrho surround us" may seem to our impressionable 
young a sort of holy-of-holies before whom the in<lividual must 
inevitably bow down. I think the following passages illustrate that 
point: 
The phenomenal self is the individual's own definition of 
his relationshin to the world about him •••• For 
practical purposes however, the culture in which we 
move is so completely and inextri~ably a part of our 
experience as to overshadow almost all else in deter-
mining the nature of the phenomenal self developed by 
each of its members. Even our definitions and values 
with respect to the pur~lv physical asnects of our 
environment are not left entirely to our own experience 
but are colored, interpreted, and valued one way or an-
other by the culture into which we are born, ~ they ~ 
interpreted to us El the acts of the :,eonle 'Who surround 
us. Thus even tne so=ci1Ied11'objective factsltwhich 
surround us are likely to be no more than the interpre-
tations of the culture in which we are raised. (p. 87) 
Indi victuals tend to seek self-enhancement thro11rh 
ic!entifving themselves with and winning the a!)nroval 
of grou~s or individuals they believe to be imoortant. 
'!'his nrinciple, which forms the chief stock in trade 
of the advertising industry, is one of ou~ most effective 
means of social control. If it is to be used effect! vely, 
it must be recognized that it is a nhenomenological prin-
cinle and not an objective one and that its effectiveness 
depends u~on the individual customer's system of values. 
(p. 187) 
Every individual lives in and is dependent unon society. 
So long as his behavior is ~onsistent with the exnectance 
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of the members of society he operates smoothly and effect-
ivefyand with amininru.m orthreat to himself from that 
society. Since he is de~n<lent upon his society in large 
part for his need satisfaction, he cannot operate in ~ys 
which would deprive him of it. (p. 138) 
While the child is born into a world of physical ob-
jects, even these are subjected to the narticular interpre-
tations of the culture so that the nhenomenal self becomes 
overwhelmingly the ~roduct of the culture. For most of us, 
the nhenomenal self we develop is a direct outgrowth of the 
culture matrix of our parents and early guardians •••• 
From them we learn to define the-world about us in 
terms of the culture into which we are born. We come to 
accept as our own reality the definitions of our exnerience 
and of those who most closely affect us •••• 
Out of interaction of the child with the world about 
him, the individual comes to differentiatemore and more 
clearly his phenomenal self. Obviously, this concent CE!n 
only be a function of the way he is treated by those who 
surround-him. Since his phenomenal self is the result of 
his exoerience, 'his behavior can only be an outgrowth of 
the ffieaning of that experience and he must necessarily 
become in truth what he has been labelled by the community 
which surrounded him. (pp. 82, BJ, ~assim:J ---
/schools today should7 provide each pupil with every 
possible opoortunity-to think of himself' as a responsible 
citizen and contributing member of society •. They would 
see that he has the widest possible opnort.unity to identify 
with and be accepted ~ the socially desirable individuals 
and groups which he admires, so that he will feel accepted 
~ and acceutable to society.-Incidentally, an individual 
who feels himself identified~ and accepted by! society 
cannot attack it. To do so would be to attack himself. 
{!). 221) 
There is certainly no place in such a theory for the child who 
stands out from the others in an,y way or for the child who is 
"different." And although in a totalitarian state it may be de-
sirable to raise up a people who "cannot attack its society" why 
should it be so vital to do so in a democracy? 
I feel our most urgent need in education just now is to help 
our young !J80ple to believe in themselves, to be individually strong, 
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and to be morally sure of what is just and wh1t is unjust--what is 
true and what is untrue. Our principle for educating should bet.his: 
~ society ~ only be ~ good ~ ~ its individuals. Those indi vi-
duals should be given, through education, something to believe in.and 
values they can depend upon. 
Edgar Ansel Mowrer has made some -pertinent statements on this 
subject in his recent article "Return to Integrity." 
~oting David Riesman7 "Why,n asks Riesman innocently, are 
American young people-so frequently aimles~, lacking private 
oassions and pursuits" (in other words half dead) "'when a 
greater variety of skilled cAreers are open to them than 
ever before?" 
Obviously, bec3usa they have been trained to eschew 
private nassions and pursuits (the thrills of life) and 
pursue only the inevitably tenid aims "'hich they find they 
have in common. 
MtJ own conversion to non-comformity began at an early 
age. More specifically, it started when, at the age of 
ten or twelve, I became aware that the n;ost interesting 
distinction among pe::ple of all ages whom I knew was be-
tween the many who accepted group standards as authoritative 
and the fewwhostubbornly insisted on thinkiiig things out 
for tne~se!ves." - -
"E pur si muove." 
This brought me into some conflict both in the oublic 
schools and a couple of American universities which I at-
tended. It also brought me some personal uncertainty 
especially when I discovered that at the state university 
conformity both of intellect arxi habits was all but indis-
Pensable to the high9st success. Could individUAlism be 
wr'Jng? 
Nevertheless, I stuck it out. I was fortified by 
what I read about great individuals and by the few really 
great people I began to meet--Jane Addams, Henrik Christian 
Andersen, and President Thomas Uasaryk of Czechosolvakia. 
I also found comfort in certain writers. I can remember my 
joy when, studying in the freer atmosphere of the University 
of Paris, I came upon the nassage by Nietzche (well ~nown, 
but not to me): 
"The surest way to corrunt a youth is to instruct him 
to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those 
who think differently." •••• 
Enoueh therefore to explain that, for me, the good 
life is the search for excellence. Excellence at its 
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origin can be only individual. Man's will is free. It follows 
therefore that the deliberate furthering of social adjustment 
as the highest human aim is immoral. The alternative to 
"integrationn i's""perscrialintegrity based £!! nersonal responsi-
bility. 
Men and women do not achieve integrity by pursuing the 
negative virtues~adjustment, security, or even conventional 
haouiness •••• They achieve excellence {and the highest 
happiness) by accepting burdens. A healthy peo~le thrives 
under troubles, as our ancestors well knew. Tocqueville 
says of the Americans of his time: 
"Life would have no relish if they were delivered from 
the anxieties which harass them.n 
What a change from the processions of defeated folk 
troooing to the osychiatrist in search of 11 adjustmentn. 
and of the courage to accept, each, "his differencen (to 
quote Frost) • • • -.- --- --
Against these great imnersonal factors making for 
co!lformity a call for individualism is like defeated Roland's 
horn at Roncevalles--msrel,y ttsad." Self-direction is as 
antiqw=ited as kpight--errantry. (And anyhow r.1ost neople, 
craving the warmth of the herd, are hapnier when integrated 
and incapable of making decisions.) 
This--the argument of the 11 integrators 11--is powerful. 
It is founded on the firm conviction that habies are th:! 
"raw material of character patterns" and therefore "infin-
itely educable." In consequence, environment, the 1•imper-
sonal factors," are definitive and bucking tram is like 
trying to stop a lava flow. 
But supuose the heredity champions are right and 
people come into this world basically pretty much as they 
will remain during their lives? If personality is inborn 
rather than shaped, then what? George Santayana has 
written: 
"In the oast or the future my language and my borrowed 
knowledge would have been different. But under whatever 
sky I had been born, since it is the same sky, I should 
have had the ~ ohilosophy. 11 -
If Santayana is right, then against the ''impersonal 
factors" of our time the greatest imnersonal factor of all 
is oresent and working against excessive "adjustment .n I 
mean, what is called human nature. Then against every 
overdevelooment, every deformation, rrankind at a certain 
moment will react and correct the balance. This has hap-
pened before. The English reacted to the excessive 
contriction of Puritanism with the license of the Restora-
tion. Germans fled from the slop?y romanticism of Sturm 
und Drang into a stony Sachlichkeit that still ma{es them 
the terror of their neighbors. Prohibition turned sober 
Americans into bootleggers and ginbibhers. 
Having lived among many neoples, from individu~list 
France to totalitarian Russia, Italy, and Germany, I have 
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come to agrge with Santayana. I find human nsture to be 
the most stable of all 1mown factors. Within mankind are 
macy who must conforrri;' some few who are incurably self-
directed, al')d, in the middle, a mass of undecided wh0 can 
go either w•:iy. The difference between soci.ety and society 
is therefore not a matter of the relative numbers of the 
three tynes. These seem roughly constant. It is a n:atter 
of the relative ?restige and influence of the tyi,es at a 
given moment. Vihen, as in the modern world, material ad-
van~age has magnified the value of uniformity, the undecided 
combine with the "integrators" to glorify a sheeplike con-
formity. When, to the contrary, the self-directed prevail 
official educators encourage individualism and the society 
goes in for hero worshio. Human nature, instinctively 
seeking so~ial health, regularly corrects an excess. 
All this may seem far-fetched. But in my eyes it is 
simole fact. Unon it I base my view that today, when the 
adjustment drive has reached the point of caricature, when 
the external •~i.amersonal factors" are urging men to be in-
sects, human nature is already quietl! busy erecting! wall 
against further encroachment •••• 3 
Mr. Mowrer and I are not alone in our concern for the imoortance 
of the individual as against that of the herd. Over a century ago 
John Stuart· Mill W"'!S aware of the same threat to the individual 
whenever too much stress is placed upon the denands of society. He 
expressed his concern in these words: 
In sober truth, wh~tever homage may be orofessed, or even 
paid, to real or sup,osed mental superiority, the general 
tendency of things throughout the world is to render medio-
crity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, 
in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the 
long transition from feudality to the Present time, the 
individual was a power in himself; and if he had either 
great talents or a high social position, he was a consider-
able power. At nresent individuals are lost in the crowd. 
In ryolitics 1r-is almost a triviality to say that nublic 
opinion now rules the world. The only ~ower deserving the 
name is th!it of masses, and of governments while they make 
themselres the organ of the tendencies and instincts of 
masses. 
It is desirable, in short, that in things which do 
not nrimarily concern othrs, individuality should ~ssert 
itself. Where, not the nerson 1s own character, but the 
13. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "Return to Integrity," The Saturday Review 
of Literature, February 5, 19.55, np. 36-lil, nassinl. 
1L. John Stu.qrt Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Reoresentati ve 
Government, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1910, 'nn: 38-41, passim. 
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traditions or customs of other oeople are the rule of 
conduct, there is wanting one of the nrincinal ingredients 
of human hanniness, and quite1~he chief ingredient of in-dh'idua 1 and socia 1 nrogr'3ss •. .; 
It is, I believe, just as imnortant in this century that our young 
students do not conclude from their readings in modern textbooks 
1) th8t to conform is better or 2) that non-conformity meanR mal-
adjustment. 
3. It seems to me that the so-called 11 phenomenological" 
anoroach tends to threRten values a student might have about 
truth or goodness, since nothing is real except what seems to be 
. ·--
real to the behaver and since nothing is true but what seems to be 
true and since facts can no longer be deoended unon to exist 
11whether anybody thinks so or not. 11 The idea that an individual 
has no choice of action since his need to enhance self regulates 
all action is a concept which may tend to tqar down a student's 
nreconceivec belief in the power of the will or in the inrr:)ortance 
cf princinle. 
If the 11 ohenomenological11 theory is adooted as a sole -prdlosonhy 
of education, then the words ideal, orincinle, will-power, truth, and 
goodness must become outworn t3rrns for outworn concents. 
4. I believe Snygg and Combs have overlooked one very important 
aspect of behavior control in their text: the pl~ce of literature, 
history, And nature in the organization of self. Snygg and Combs 
stress the importance of the ~henomenal self, the enhancement and 
maintaining of which :ts the cause of all behavior. But they also 
lSo Ibid., P• 115. 
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say the self is lArgely determined and molded by the community, 
nublic or,inion, society. They treat <it length ways in which the 
self is threaten'9d a!1d changed by this external pressure, but 
they do not mention or stress one potent factor in the building 
of an "adequate" "?henomenal self or a concept of self as "good." 
It is not mentioned in the text nor is it imnlied that Poetry, 
a study of history, and contact with nature can and do orovide 
the best possible means of "organizing" the self, which in turn 
?rovides the needed behavior control. 
By nature I :i.nclude a wide range of influences. There is 
the simnle contemnlation of nature which satisfies the human need 
for beauty (enhancement? or maintenance?) and which may be experi-
enced by all children regardless of bad teachers or bad parents. 
(Believe me, there ~ "bad11 teacl.,ers and there are 11 badtt parents, 
and this I state as a fact according to Russell and not as a fact 
according to Snygg and Combs. The daily newspa?ers with accounts 
of what happens to some children at the hands of some narents and 
some teAchers substantiate my assertion.) By nature I also include 
the field of ph.vsic3l science, for from the study of such truths as 
are revealed by exoerimentation arise an awareness of and a resuect 
for a higher cause than man has yet discovered. 
By Poetry I mean of course the whole field of literature from 
fable to novel, essay, poetry, and drama. Each form 11rovides its 
own unique medium for enriching a "behaver' s fi13ld" and nrovides 
a yardstick for his subsequent behavior which is not de".>endent 
upon the "threat II of parents, teachers, or friends. 
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The same kind cf yardstick for moral values can be obtained 
from a "behaver's" study of history. The child "differentiates" 
(Perceives, learns, reasons) from inward "exoerience'l rather than 
from external events (outward "experience) mainly. As a result, 
his self-conce'Dt may become and remain good in spite of his com-
munity. To say that poetry, history, and nature 11feed the soul, 11 
or "mind," or "spirit" is incompatible with a theory such as Snygg 
and Combs' "phenomenological" control of b~havior. One does not 
speak in such terms when travelling the modern psychologist's path. 
Integ~ity, character, truth, goodness, and beauty seem to be old-
fashion~d words for non-existent concepts, if everything is relative 
in this world of ours, if nothing can be depended u~on as being true, 
and if the individual must become "in truth" the product of and sub-
servient to the group. 
Young peoole need to have values given to them, not taken away. 
The danger in relying solsly on a theory such as that of Snygg and 
Combs in education lies just there. Joseph Wood Krutch in his book 
The Measuro 2£ Man has voiced his awareness of that danger effectively. 
To say that the world could be saved by a solution of its 
rnor~l problems would sound unconvincing enough to most 
people. What~~ ~re ~roposing seems even less promisin~. 
What it comes down to is salvation, not through the solu-
tion of the ~roblems of morality, but through the mere 
recognition that tney exist. 
Yet one must start somewhere if one is to st~rt at 
all, and the whole trend of this discussion has been to 
suggest that there is no other place to st~rt. Grant 
th3 premise, either that human freedom does not exist 
or even that it is too limited to be worth taking into 
account, and there is no breaking the chain of logic 
which leads ultimately to the oo~ition of the most ex-
tre:r.ta proponents of "hurnan engineering" as the only 
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method of dealing with man or h:ts nroblems. Grant his contentions 
and there is YlO breaking the chain which leads in its turn to 
some sort of totalitarian society. If, on the other hand, 
everrthing which has been or ever will be was not fixed and 
inevitable from the dawn of creation, then it must be because 
of either a random element iYl the universe or because art ef-
fective freedom to choose exists somewhere. And there seems 
no more likely place where it micht reside than in man himself. 
If he is to use +.his freedom actually to move the world, if he 
is not merely to be moved by it, then he must have some point 
outside the world of the physically and mentally determined on 
which to rest his lever. That fulcrum cannot be anything else 
except "values" deliberately chosen. 
Thus, however limited h'-l1118n freedom may be, the freedom, 
if it exists at all, is unique, and given a lever ~ith which 
to operate, there is no guessing how ~owerful a force the free 
man may exert. To say this is not to s~y that rulers, educators, 
nublicists, and social workers should henceforth rely on nothing 
except man as a free moral agent and therefore on his omver to 
choose his values and govern his conduct. But it does ):~an that 
they must not leave any of these things out of account. 
18. Joseph Wood Krutch, The Measure of Man, New York, The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., Inc., 1953, pp. 256-257.~ ~~ 
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